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“A liquid, highly innovative financial system is necessary for the growth of modern 
economies. It is not only the lubricant that smooth the friction of exchange from the 
neighbourhood shop to global money markets, it is also when mixed with 
entrepreneurship, skills and innovation, the fuel in the engine of economic growth (...) But 
finance is highly volatile material, liable to explode and destroy the very engine is oils and 
fuels. It must be managed with care.” (Eatwell & Taylor, 2000, p. 208) 
 
Introduction 
 
The financial crisis that surfaced in the United States of America in late 2007 
and unfolded in 2008 has significantly brought to light the vulnerability of 
global financial markets. Haute finance appeared to be a high risk game of 
financial engineering where profits and losses may be significant (because of 
so-called leveraging) and insolvency of even a few major financial institutions 
(investment banks, securities firms, insurance companies) may inflict serious 
damage upon the global economy.  
 
The causes of the financial crisis have been extensively discussed elsewhere.1 
High risk loans based on sub-prime mortgages appeared to be a profitable 
business for those who were able to collect the upfront fees. Subsequently, 
these loans were ‘sliced and diced’ (the process of securitisation), and sold to 
investors who did not bother to invest in an adequate due diligence. Each 
time a loan was sold, packaged, securitised and resold, banks took their 
transaction fees. Until the crisis began, the banks erroneously believed that 
securities were secure and profitable.  
 
Deeper roots of the crisis may be found in the development of financial 
markets since the 1980s. In traditional financial markets, banks were holding 
deposits, attracting savings and lending money. In this marketplace there is a 
common interest that risks must be known and restrained. Voluntary and 
mutual self-restraint are necessarily involved, and are easily explained, since 
banks lend and borrow to one another. They are willing to do so as long as 
each bank is satisfied that the other bank does not take excessive risks in its 
financial operations. Should a bank take higher risks than is acceptable for its 
                                                
* Lecturer in International Economic Law, VU University Amsterdam. 
1 G. Caprio Jr. (Willams College), A. Demirgüç-Kunt (World Bank) E.J. Kane, The 2007 
Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats, September 5, 2008. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/KaneCaprioDemirgucKunt-
The2007Meltdown.pdf. (accessed on 2 April 2009). 
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peers, it will no longer be eligible for inter-bank lending. In this system of 
self-regulation a ‘gentle’ form of supervision2  would be adequate.  
 
In recent years financial markets have changed drastically.3 New institutions 
emerged that are in the business of banking, insurance and securities. Hedge 
funds, investment banks and similar institutions deal in innovative and high-
leveraged financial products. In this heterogeneous system of traditional and 
innovative banking, the absence of self-restraint may easily disturb mutual 
confidence. Once confidence is gone, the financial markets desist from 
lending and borrowing. For an economy that thrives on credit, this has a 
devastating effect. 
 
Fierce competition may be cited to explain why financial institutions were 
forced to innovate and accept higher risks. A bank that was not in the 
business of high-leveraged and profitable securities would ‘disappoint’ its 
shareholders. In addition, risk-taking was a ‘one-way-bet’ for Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) whose income depended to a significant degree upon 
bonuses. It is true that gluttony has contributed much to the conditions in 
which financial markets find themselves today.  Bankers may be blamed for 
what they have done but there is little reason to assume that greed in the 
banking sector is more prominent than in any other economic sector.  
 
More worrying is that exogenous corrective mechanisms for controlling risks 
have collectively failed. Domestic supervisors such as central banks, financial 
authorities and  comparable institutions (hereinafter: supervisors) did not 
ring alarm bells well before  markets failed. A major explanation is that such 
domestic supervisors were unable to keep pace with innovative markets and 
had little understanding of products that came from complex financial 
engineering. In addition, supervisors had only limited jurisdiction over hedge 
funds and investment banks for two reasons. First, supervisors did not cover 
‘blind spots’ in financial markets; a deposit–taking bank would be supervised 
but a non-deposit bank or ‘hedge fund’ operated without supervision. 
Second, supervision did not extend beyond borders. It is therefore only 
partly justified that the role of supervisors has been heavily criticised because 
they were not paying attention, “failing to appreciate the scale of risks being 
built up in the ‘shadow’ banking system that modern finance had created.”4  
 
Following the collapse of financial markets political leaders have urged for 
firm reforms. The Prime Ministers of the UK and Germany insisted on 
stronger global regulation and coordinated supervision. Gordon Brown 
                                                
2 Supervision is in the Oxford English Dictionary defined as “(…) less commonly, 
supervision for the purpose of direction or control, superintendence.” Other synonyms of 
supervision are ‘oversight’ and ‘surveillance’. The scope depends of the functions attached 
in legal texts. 
3 For an explanation see J.C. Marquardt, ‘Financial Market Supervision: Some Conceptual 
Issues’, BIS Economic Papers (19) May 1987. 
4 ‘A monetary malaise. Central bankers helped cause today’s mess. Will they be able to 
clean it up?’, The Economist, 9 October  2008. 
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asked for “an early warning system of risk on any continent in the world 
economy” as well as replacing “the patchwork of current regulation.” He 
would also push for an agreement on international standards of transparency 
and disclosure for financial institutions and products. In addition, he insisted 
on the need to reform and strengthen international institutions, giving them 
power and resources to invest at the global level.5 Similar pleas for a stronger 
international regulation and supervision were made by President Nicolas 
Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel. In a confrontational statement, 
Bundeskanzlerin Merkel said she would “react very strongly” if the financial 
community tried to block government’s efforts to tighten regulation.6  
 
The G20 framework is currently at the stage where world leaders meet on 
reforms. The G20 aims at revising the system of global financial governance 
and pursue a global early warning system to identify and mitigate future risks. 
The group is assigned to develop globally accepted standards of supervision 
and regulation, effective cross-border supervision of global firms and 
mechanisms for co-operation and concerted action in a crisis.7 
 
This contribution looks at the stance of intergovernmental and governmental 
institutions in supervising financial markets. The focus lies on the global 
framework.8 Should domestic supervisors be adapted to the intricacies of 
international financial markets or does the world need international 
supervisors? How well are domestic banking supervisors equipped to deal 
with seamless global financial markets? If global supervisors must take 
responsibility, which international institutions would be equipped for this 
task? In this contribution it is argued that the crisis of 2008 has also exposed 
a crisis of institutions responsible for overseeing financial markets. A 
dedicated system of international and national supervisors is necessary and 
politically feasible. 
 
I. Central Banks as Custodians of the Financial System 
 
In the turbulent financial markets of today, central banks are expected to be 
the anchor of stability and throw a lifeline in case of financial distress. 
Central banks are not the only institutions that oversee financial institutions. 
States have created dedicated supervisors to oversee insurance companies 
and security traders. 
 
                                                
5 ‘Brown lays out agenda for G20 crisis meeting’, Agence France Presse , 30 January 2009. See 
also other statements at ‘Britain’s Brown urges coordinated economic action,’ Associated 
Press Newswires, 26 January 2009, and ‘Brown says recovery need global co-operation,’ 
Financial Times, 17 January 2009. 
6 Financial Times, 9 January 2009. 
7 http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk (accessed on 12 February 2009). 
8 For a European perspective on supervision see E. Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of 
Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and 
Multiple Financial Supervisors’, European Business Organization Law Review , Vol. 8, 2007, pp. 
237-306. 
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For the banking sector the central bank will be the most frequent supervisor. 
Central banks find their roots in private institutions, which were given special 
statutory powers such as the monopoly to issue banknotes or the prime 
responsibility to provide short term credit to state-institutions. From the 
1930s onwards these institutions evolved into public organs through 
increasing state involvement in the appointment of governors or by outright 
nationalisation. In our time each state is expected to have its own currency 
and have its own central bank for the management of the currency. There are 
some exceptions. A limited number of economically less important states do 
not have their own currency and may use the currency of another state. In 
the European Union a currency is shared by a number of member states. 
 
Central banks are the prime institutions in preserving the stability of the 
financial system. They operate through two methods. First, they have a 
particular responsibility for promoting price stability and employment. 
Several instruments are available to achieve price stability: managing liquidity 
(controlling the circulation of money in the national economy) or setting 
short-term interest rates. A central bank may also have a mandate to promote 
employment. A central bank is expected to balance the need to promote 
price stability against the objective of promoting employment. A policy too 
strict on price stability may stifle economic growth, and, alternatively, 
unimpeded economic growth may stimulate inflation. To achieve a balance, 
central bank officials must be in constant dialogue with finance ministries 
and other relevant institutions. A responsible central bank is expected to 
resist demands of governments to finance state projects or increase money 
supply if this would result in price inflation above a particular level.9 These 
rules would normally apply in a stable economy, but may be set aside in 
emergency situations. 
 
A second task is regulating and supervising banking institutions to secure the 
safety and soundness of the financial system. The objective of supervision 
and regulation is to manage risks of market failure. A number of supervisory 
tasks may be identified. These are, inter alia, licensing, (testing business plans, 
                                                
9 Interests may be balanced in different ways. The European Central Bank governs the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It distinguishes primary and secondary 
objectives. Art. 105 of the Treaty on European Union reads: “The primary objective of the 
ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down 
in Article 2. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 3a.” The US Federal Reserve System puts 
price stability on an equal footing with employment. The goals of monetary policy are 
spelled out in the Federal Reserve Act, which specifies that governing bodies should seek 
“to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rates.” For a comparison between single (price stability) and dual (price 
stability and employment) mandates see G. Fontana, ‘The Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank: a theoretical comparison of their legislative mandates’, Journal of 
Post Keynsian Economics, Spring 2006, Vol. 28. No. 3. 433ff. 
67 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM VOL 1:3 
checking integrity of executives), compliance with minimal capital 
requirement (such as those agreed in Basel II – see below), review of 
disclosure requirements, compliance with anti-laundering regulation and 
overseeing mergers and acquisition.  
 
II. Regulators and Supervisors  
 
A distinction should be made between regulating and supervising markets. 
Regulators create rules aimed at financial institutions; their main objective is 
to foster financial stability and to protect those who use financial services.10 
Overseeing compliance with regulations is the responsibility of supervisors. 
A supervisor which finds that a financial institution does not meet legal 
requirements may decide to enter into a dialogue or reprimand a non-
compliant institution. 
 
Regulation of the banking sector is primarily a matter within national 
jurisdictions. To a limited extend international regulation takes place. The 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an important example of an 
international regulator that operates by consensual agreement between 
central banks. Being a vehicle for central banks, the BIS produced the Basel 
II framework that describes the minimum standard for capital adequacy. 
These standards are expected to be implemented by national legislators and 
supervised by national authorities. The objective of Basel II is to tailor 
regulatory capital requirements to the underlying risks that banks face in 
market operations. Closely related to the BIS is the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) which keeps a small secretariat at the BIS headquarters. The FSF is an 
informal, non-institutionalised body, bringing together senior representatives 
of national financial authorities (e.g. central banks, other supervisory 
authorities and treasury departments), international financial institutions, 
international regulatory and supervisory groupings, committees of central 
bank experts and the European Central Bank. The FSF holds an unfocussed 
mandate. It is expected to assess vulnerabilities affecting the international 
financial system, identify and oversee action needed to address these and 
improve co-ordination and information exchange among the various 
authorities responsible for financial stability.11 In the Leader’s Statement at 
the London Summit of 2 April 2009 the FSF was replaced by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB).12 The FSB was assigned to a number of tasks aimed at 
                                                
10 Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques 
de Larosière,  (hereinafter de Larosière Group), p. 13. The Group published its report after 
request by the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, to give advice 
on the future of European financial regulation and supervision. The group was composed 
of Leszek Balcerowicz, Otmar Issing, Rainer Masera, Callum Mc Carthy Lars Nyberg, José 
Pérez and Onno Ruding. 
11 http://www.fsforum.org/about/mandate.htm  (accessed on 22 March 2009). 
12 Leaders statement appears at 
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409 . 
Attached to the statement is the ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System – 
London Summit’, (accessed on 2 April 2009). 
68 A PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 2009 
 
improving and harmonising international regulation of financial markets, and 
strengthened collaboration amongst national supervisors, inter alia by the 
establishment of supervisory colleges.13 These proposals should improve 
macro-prudential oversight. 
 
The BIS and comparable institutions only make a moderate contribution to 
the regulation of financial markets. Attempts to harmonise standards through 
non-binding instruments have had half-hearted results. Moreover, even if 
adequate legislation exists it is far from certain that domestic supervisors will 
effectively implement such legislation because domestic economic and 
political interests may warrant a distinctive approach. 
 
In contrast to regulation, supervision is exclusively a domestic matter. The task 
of supervision may be in the hands of central banks, financial markets 
authorities or other institutions. While it is important to discern regulatory 
and supervisory powers, there is considerable spill-over in the exercise of 
these powers. 
 
III. Dynamic Supervision 
 
The need to make a distinction between regulators and supervisors is less 
obvious in the context of financial markets. Discrete responsibilities for 
regulation and supervision may be in accordance with textbooks on the 
separation of powers but denies the dynamic interaction between creation 
and enforcement of rules. If it is accepted that the objective of both 
regulation and supervision of markets is managing systemic risk, then the 
supervisor must have competence and a wide degree of discretion. In a 
rapidly changing world, risk assessments are subject to continuous changing 
perceptions, and, accordingly, supervisory competences must be frequently 
re-adjusted. In other words: if financial market engineer new high risk 
                                                
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-sysm 
(accessed on 2 April 2009). 
13 The FSB will: “assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, identify and oversee 
action needed to address them; promote co-ordination and information exchange among 
authorities responsible for financial stability; monitor and advise on market developments 
and their implications for regulatory policy; advise on and monitor best practice in meeting 
regulatory standards; undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of 
the international Standard Setting Bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, 
focused on priorities, and addressing gaps; set guidelines for, and support the 
establishment, functioning of, and participation in, supervisory colleges, including through 
ongoing identification of the most systemically important cross-border firms; support 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to 
systemically important firms; and collaborate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to conduct Early Warning Exercises to identify and report to the International Monetary 
Fund Committee (IMFC) and the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on 
the build up of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address 
them.” http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-
sysm (accessed on 23 April 2009). 
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products, a supervisor must respond instantly without having to wait for 
action by the regulator. 
 
A law describing static rules and principles is therefore inappropriate for 
supervising markets. Legislators may not anticipate the financial engineering 
of advanced banking. They also may not foresee the emergence of the so-
called ‘shadow banking system’ that includes financial institutions that are 
not de jure banks, and therefore beyond supervision, but are heavily involved 
in the banking business.14 Prescriptive rules and a product-based regime are 
therefore too inflexible and cannot respond to new financial products. There 
is a need for an authority that “continuously adapts the scope and content of 
regulations to the changing structure of international markets and the 
changing character of firms”.15 Accordingly, supervisors should be able to 
track the dynamics of the financial markets where the pace of innovation is 
high and markets are creative in finding ways to circumvent regulations in 
order to maximise profits. From this dynamic approach it follows that a 
dogmatic distinction between regulation and supervision is inadequate to deal 
with markets. Only a supervisor with discretionary regulatory powers may 
effectively monitor financial markets.  
 
IV. Are Domestic Banking Supervisors Capable? 
 
In light of the current crisis a more fundamental question concerns the 
capabilities of domestic supervisors. Staffed with dozens highly qualified 
analysts, they failed to recognise the systemic risks or declined to take 
preventive measures. Banking supervisors are expected to evaluate banking 
policies, practices and procedures related to the granting of loans and making 
of investments. This means that the supervisor needs to ensure that the 
credit and investment function of a bank is grounded on sound principles16 
and that policies derived from such principles are transparently written down. 
In 1997 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued core principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision. Principles include licensing requirements, 
prudential regulations,17 methods of supervision, information requirements 
and cross-border banking.  The core principles underline the need for 
consolidated supervision in case of cross-border banking.18 It states that 
                                                
14 These may take various forms, such as hedge funds and investment banks. These entities 
are primarily based in the US and were outside Federal Reserve supervision because they 
are not depository institutions. For their role in the financial system see ‘Barbarians at the 
Vault’, The Economist, 15 May 2008. 
15 J. Eatwell & L. Taylor, Global Finance at Risk, a Case for Global Financial Regulation, The 
New Press 2000, pp. 194, 223. 
16 ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Basel September 1997.  
17 Meaning regulation of deposit-taking institutions and supervision of the conduct of these 
institutions, and set down requirements that limit their risk-taking. The aim of prudential 
regulation and supervision is to ensure the safety of depositors’ funds and preserve the 
stability of the financial system. 
18 Consolidated supervision means that supervision may also take place with regard to 
branches of a bank established abroad. 
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“banking supervisors must practise global consolidated supervision” by 
which “a key component of consolidated supervision is establishing contact 
and information exchange with the various other supervisors involved, 
primarily host country supervisory authorities”.19 An example of such co-
operation is the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) which 
is comprised of high level representatives from the banking supervisory 
authorities and central banks of the European Union. The CBES has 
adopted guidelines on supervisory disclosure based on Basel II provisions.20  
 
There are some explanations why domestic banking supervisors face 
difficulties in effectively supervising financial markets.  
 
• Financial markets operate on a global scale, while domestic 
supervisors operate on a national scale. Major commercial banks 
jointly create a seamless global financial system in which transactions 
are virtually beyond what the ‘patchwork’ of national supervisors can 
‘see’. Accordingly, domestic banking supervisors cannot provide 
macro-prudential supervision. While, central banks focus on the 
performance of individual bank (micro-prudential supervision) they 
miss a broader picture. Macro-prudential supervision would 
encompass all sectors of finance and deals with the wider economic 
context, on the regional level and the global level.21 This deficiency 
might explain why early warning signals, well before the crisis 
surfaced, were not provided. 
• Domestic regulation and supervision offer ample room for regulatory 
arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring a financial product 
in such a way that it brings about the lowest regulatory burden, both 
in terms of capital requirements and in terms of administrative 
burden, or that it even evades a regulatory regime. Regulatory 
arbitrage created the development of offshore banking in low tax 
jurisdictions, providing legal and regulatory advantages. 
• There is a lack of expertise of supervisors because ‘those who 
understand the market best are likely to be employed in the markets in 
positions that pay far more than those funded by the public purse’.22 
It is not unlikely that only a limited number of regulators have 
thorough understanding of all the intricacies of financial markets. 
Dutch regulators argued that had they understood risks on and off 
balance sheets, they would not have approved the acquisition of ABN 
AMRO by Fortis in 2007.23 
• Domestic banking supervisors may have a national interest not to 
‘harass’ domestic commercial banks in order to avoid a ‘bank run’. An 
                                                
19 Supra note 16, Principles 23 and 24. 
20 Basel II requirements are implemented in the EU by Capital Requirements Directive 
2006/48/EC. 
21 De Larosière Group, supra note 10, p.39. 
22 Eatwell & Taylor 2000,  supra note 15, p. 195. De Larosière Group, supra note 10, p. 50. 
23 Financieel Dagblad, 23 January 2009. 
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early warning system bringing bad news about a commercial bank’s 
performance may cause a run on liquidity of (international) clients. 
This is not in the interest of the national economy and a supervisor 
may fear a collapse of more local banks. This is probably what 
happened in Iceland in late 2008 when its central bank did not 
provide information to other central banks because of commercial 
confidentiality or legal constraints.24  
• Domestic supervisors may have questionable independence vis-à-vis 
financial markets. Even if adequate legislation is in place and expertise 
is available, staff of regulators may seek job opportunities or have a 
professional background in commercial banking; under such 
circumstances decision-making may be biased by sentiments or undue 
empathy for the ailing financial conditions of banks.25 
 
V. Will International Supervision Work? 
 
The establishment of an international supervisor takes away some of the 
limitations that national supervisors face but may have disadvantages too. 
Advantages are obvious: a global supervisor would be able to exercise 
jurisdiction that truly covers the global marketplace. Unimpeded by 
jurisdictional borders, it can oversee cross-border movement of capital in 
whatever form. Nourished with a constant flow of data the global supervisor 
is able to understand financial innovative products, track the origins of 
financial products and appreciate how products disperse through the 
financial system. An international supervisor may also bring better expertise 
because they should be able to afford top salaries for top experts. Moreover, 
being part of an international institution and having no bonds to national 
                                                
24 Also De Larosière Group, supra note 10, p. 41.  
25 This point was made when Henry Paulson was appointed US Treasury Secretary in the 
Bush administration in 2006. Prior to public service Paulson was working for Goldman 
Sachs. “The question isn't how it's a conflict of interest for Paulson to preside over our 
country's economy but how it’s not. (..)  Even if Paulson ultimately sells all his stock and 
finds a way to offload his restricted stock, he will wield in the meantime enormous 
influence over the Treasury bond and foreign currency trading positions of Goldman, with 
every policy decision on debt issuance or the dollar that he makes. What’s good for 
Goldman isn’t necessarily good for Middle America. Therein lies the conflict of a man 
whose entire career has been predicated on successfully promoting corporate welfare over 
public interest.” The Nation, 26 June 2006. Former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson 
criticizes the warm relationship between supervisors and those supervised. “One channel 
of influence was, of course, the flow of individuals between Wall Street and Washington. 
Robert Rubin, once the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, served in Washington as Treasury 
secretary under Clinton, and later became chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee. 
Henry Paulson, CEO of Goldman Sachs during the long boom, became Treasury secretary 
under George W. Bush. John Snow, Paulson’s predecessor, left to become chairman of 
Cerberus Capital Management, a large private-equity firm that also counts Dan Quayle 
among its executives. Alan Greenspan, after leaving the Federal Reserve, became a 
consultant to Pimco, perhaps the biggest player in international bond markets.” ‘The Quiet 
Coup’, The Atlantic Online, May 2009. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-
advice/ (accessed on 1 April 2009). 
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jurisdictions, officials may likely be more independent and less reluctant to 
put into effect an early warning system on domestic bank performance.   
 
However, a single global supervision, even for key players in financial 
markets, is difficult to achieve politically and practically. It would be unlikely 
that current financial centres in the US, Europe and Asia would be willing to 
surrender supervisory jurisdiction to an international body. Lobbyists from 
financial market will likely be successful to convince decision making bodies 
that a global supervisor would stifle innovation, and incur more bureaucracy 
and higher costs.  A major practical disadvantage would be the sheer size of 
the financial system and the remoteness to local markets. A distant global 
supervisor is unable to be in constant dialogue with the numerous players on 
the financial markets.  
 
A more acceptable and realistic model might therefore be based on a system 
of supervisors whereby an international supervisor will need to work with 
and through national (or regional) supervisors. The Federal Reserve System 
or the European System of Central Banks may serve as an example. In these 
structures a balance is struck between decentralised and centralised 
institutions. In the EU the European Central Bank (ECB) governs the ESCB, 
a system of central banks (ECB and National Central Banks (NCBs)). In this 
system the ECB and NCBs each have there own responsibility according to 
the Treaty on European Union and the ESCB Protocol.  
 
VI. Creating a System of Regulators and Supervisors 
 
Currently, a disorderly patchwork of intergovernmental institutions has been 
assigned to develop proposals for improved oversight of financial markets. 
There is no clear authority and the legal status of recommendation, 
communiqués, decisions and reports issued by various bodies is ambiguous. 
For instance, what is the status of a G20 communiqué? Does it create a 
binding commitment for participating states, or even non-participants? What 
are the consequences if a major industrialised state fails to implement 
regulations?  How does the FSB decide on regulations? Unanimity, 
consensus or majority? Does it have any legal authority to do so? What 
would be the consequence if two institutions propose conflicting regulations? 
Even if agreement is reached, states may reject the adoption of regulations or 
adapt regulations to their own needs, thereby creating divergence in the 
application of standards. The current institutional framework for 
international regulation is inherently weak. 
 
An authoritative centralised institution is required that adopts and protects 
global standards. A parallel can be found in the world trading system. Since 
1995 the world trading system is governed by a single institution: the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO oversees a system where at least 
some universally accepted standards for international trade are cast in stone, 
such as the need to ensure national treatment for imported goods or the 
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prohibition to retaliate unilaterally in case of a trade conflict. Considering the 
fact that it was possible to overcome considerable obstacles and create the 
WTO, it may also be feasible to establish a World Financial Organisation 
(WFO) for regulating financial markets. The establishment of a WFO would 
create a proper counterweight in the international economic system. By 
reconciling distinct objectives – liberalisation of international trade flows 
(WTO objective) and creation of stability in the international financial system 
(WFO objective) – trade protectionism and financial crises may be given less 
chance to disrupt the international economy. The WTO and WFO share 
objectives on a more elevated level as their raison d’étre is the desire to 
promote national and international prosperity.26  
 
The system aims to regulate and supervise states and financial markets. It will 
be designed to oversee macroeconomic policies of governments and 
behaviour of financial markets. The system recognises that financial markets 
are an important non-state actor on the international plane and that their 
behaviour can only be effectively controlled by international regulation and 
dedicated supervision. The WFO runs the system and its constituent parts 
are subordinate to the WFO. The system incorporates a number of relevant 
institutions. It streamlines their activities – preventing overlap and lacunae – , 
creates hierarchy and allocates responsibilities. Its constituent elements are 
discussed below. Most elements already exist; new are the WFO and the 
systemic risk councils. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. The Word Financial Organisation 
 
The proposed WFO would accept universal membership of states and be an 
institution that brings together relevant financial and monetary authorities.27 
Its establishment reflects the new reality of the financial system by focussing 
on both states and financial markets. The WFO will have a dual function in 
                                                
26 Compare to the key objectives of the WTO in the preamble of the Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organisation, i.e. promoting sustainable development and to 
develop “an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”  
27 Much along the same lines Eatwell and Taylor propose a World Financial Authority. 
Eatwell & Taylor 2000, supra note 15, Chapter 7. 
Expert bodies for standard setting 
(FSB, BIS, IOSCO and other) 
macro-economic oversight of countries and 
temporary financing of balance of payments 
deficits by IMF 
macro-prudential supervision of 
international financial markets by  
Systemic Risk Councils 
micro-economic oversight of developing 
countries and project financing  
by World Bank 
micro-prudential supervision of financial 
markets by national central banks also 
organised in colleges of supervisors 
World Financial  
Organisation overseeing  
supervisory bodies 
 overseeing sovereign actors  overseeing financial markets 
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that it considers macroeconomic policies of governments on the one hand 
and behaviour of financial markets on the other hand. Addressing both 
spheres makes sense because macroeconomic policies (including balance of 
payments, reserves, foreign indebtedness, exchange rate policies, 
liberalisation of capital movement) strongly affect financial markets. 
Conversely, financial markets behaviour may have a deep impact on the 
macroeconomic performance of states.28  
 
To ensure its authoritativeness WFO-members annually meet on ministerial 
level and consider reports of the IMF, International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and joint prudential supervisors. The WFO will 
employ the best financial experts and award them a competitive 
remuneration. The primary task of the WFO would be to gather information, 
harmonise standards and procedures and oversee enforcement. The WFO 
does not itself enforce regulations. Rather, it will oversee and coordinate the 
enforcement activities of national regulators in international cases.29 The 
WFO issues regulatory standards assisted by the BIS, FSF and other standard 
setting expert bodies. Through adoption of standards the WFO instructs the 
system’s constituent parts and its membership. Standards will be adopted by 
the WFO executive body in which weighted votes are fairly distributed.  
 
In the new system the status of IMF and World Bank will be downgraded by 
subordination to the WFO. Their mandate will be unaffected but they need 
to operate within the system. They will serve not as political bodies but as 
technocratic institutions. The WFO would take over the political nature of 
the IMF by convening annual meetings of finance ministers and national 
regulators. The WFO may also provide for a dispute settlement system when 
states fail to comply with agreed standards or decline to exercise adequate 
supervision. A parallel may be found in the dispute settlement system of the 
WTO. The system may also settle disputes between the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and countries. 
 
VIII. Overseeing Sovereign Actors 
 
Established in 1945, the IMF and World Bank are designed to promote 
stability in the international monetary system and advance economic 
development. The object of their activities is macro- and microeconomic 
policies of countries. Their role in the system will be much the same as it is 
now. However, the WFO may steer their activities in a particular direction. 
For example, the WFO may ask the IMF to address the problem of 
international liquidity in times when financial markets face a shrinkage of 
credit facilities.  
 
                                                
28 The financial crisis in the 1990s was caused by abrupt withdrawal of capital from 
emerging economies. These economies were in decline and running out of foreign reserves.  
29 Eatwell & Taylor 2000, supra note 15, p. 223. 
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How do IMF and World Bank perform today? The International Monetary 
Fund oversees macro-economic policies in general and monetary policies of 
countries in particular. Article IV Section 3 of its Articles of Agreement 
stipulates that the Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in 
order to ensure its effective operation. In consultations with monetary 
authorities of each member country, the Fund exercises ‘firm surveillance’ 
over the economic and financial policies and lays down ‘firm basic principles’ 
to which member countries must adhere. Oversight is also exercised in order 
to promote stability in the international monetary system and avoid 
manipulated exchange rates with the purpose to achieve competitive 
advantages.  
 
Article IV consultations include discussions on policies with all members on 
an annual basis. An IMF member must be willing to provide information and 
receive advice from the Fund. The objective of the co-operation is to ensure 
orderly exchange arrangements30 and to promote a ‘stable system of 
exchange rates’ and, through this, the facilitation or trade of goods and 
services amongst countries. The IMF does not have unimpeded jurisdiction 
over monetary matters. It may only deal with the liberalisation of current 
transactions, i.e. transactions related to trade.31 The IMF does not have a 
mandate that promotes cross border movements of capital.  
 
The Fund’s provisions on surveillance are couched in vague terms and the 
resulting softness is generally considered a major weakness. The surveillance 
procedure has in practice only limited effect for the simple reason that the 
obligations have no far-reaching consequences: soft obligations do not make 
for strict oversight. In the consultations, only the weight of arguments and, 
to a certain extent, peer pressure play a role in persuading a country to bring 
its economic policy more in line with what the IMF finds desirable. Effective 
IMF surveillance thus crucially depends on the willingness of members to 
take the Fund's advice. Unfortunately, many countries tend to ignore the 
Fund’s advice. 
 
The World Bank activities are focused on the micro-economic management 
of developing countries. A major activity of the Bank is lending money for 
project financing. Countries that borrow from the World Bank (often in joint 
operation with the IMF) are expected to carefully consider the micro-
economic management of their economy. A major tool for restructuring the 
national economy is the Poverty Reduction Strategy which addresses budget 
allocations, problems of fragmented budgets and the absence of budget 
discipline. The Bank urges countries to be accountable and efficient in the 
management of public resources. Accordingly, public finance management 
must achieve an overall fiscal discipline and ensure that public spending is in 
line with available resources. In this process the Bank also oversees that 
resources are allocated effectively to priority needs. This means that 
                                                
30 Exchange arrangement is the policy of a member on the exchange rate of its currency.  
31 Cf. Art. XXX(d) IMF Articles of Agreement. 
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resources are used in such a way that they provide maximum value for 
money.32 
 
In sum, the IMF and World Bank assess economic performance of states 
(and not of financial markets). The IMF focuses on macro-economic 
management, whereas the World Bank focuses on micro-economic 
management. Each institution operates in its own domain, but they are 
expected to cooperate.33 
 
IX. Overseeing Financial Markets 
 
International oversight over financial market is highly deficient. The de 
Larosière Group finds that there is an “evident lack of a coherent framework 
for designing and enforcing minimum regulatory standards, for identifying 
risks to financial stability and for coordinating supervisory policies at the 
global level. Moreover, there are practically no arrangements for cross-border 
financial crisis management at the global level and for enforcement. What is 
needed now is a strengthened, more coherent and streamlined international 
financial regulatory and surveillance system, building on the better use of 
existing international institutions.”34 Both the de Larosière Group and the 
G20 believe that supervision over commercial actors should be based on a 
                                                
32 http://go.worldbank.org/YTBYFB2AJ0 (accessed 2 April 2009).  
33 For this purpose the IMF and World Bank have concluded an agreement on co-
operation. ‘Memorandum to the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund and 
the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank’ 30 March 1989. The division of 
labour is described as follows:  
“The Fund has among its purposes the promotion of economic conditions conducive to 
growth, price stability, and balance of payments sustainability and is required to exercise 
surveillance on a continual basis over the performance of its members as defined by Article 
IV. The Fund is empowered to provide temporary balance of payments financing to 
members to enable them to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. Thus, the Fund 
has focused on the aggregate aspects of macroeconomic policies and their related 
instruments – including public sector spending and revenues, aggregate wage and price 
policies, money and credit, interest rates and the exchange rate. The Fund has to discharge 
responsibilities with respect to surveillance, exchange rate matters, balance of payments, 
growth oriented stabilization policies and their related instruments. These are the areas in 
which the Fund has a mandate, primary responsibility, and a record of expertise and 
experience.  
The Bank has the objective of promoting economic growth and conditions conducive to 
efficient resource allocation, which it pursues through investment lending, sectoral and 
structural adjustment loans. Thus, the Bank has focused on development strategies; sector 
and project investments; structural adjustment programs; policies which deal with the 
efficient allocation of resources in both public and private sectors: priorities in government 
expenditures; reforms of administrative systems, production, trade and financial sectors; 
the restructuring of state enterprises and sector policies. Moreover, as a market-based 
institution, the Bank also concerns itself with issues relating to the creditworthiness of its 
members. In these areas, except for the aggregate aspects of the economic policies 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Bank has a mandate, primary responsibility, and a 
record of expertise and experience.” 
34 De Larosière Group, supra note 10, p. 59. 
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two-tier system.35 First, national supervisors will continue to exercise micro-
prudential oversight. Second, macro-prudential oversight will be a new 
feature in the system; this form of oversight needs to be established in such a 
way in order to oversee financial markets as a whole, and not merely the 
individual actors in the market. Supervisors providing macro-prudential 
oversight are expected to recognise systemic risks well before they become a 
threat.  
 
X. Micro-prudential Oversight 
 
Micro-prudential supervision refers to the supervisory activities towards a 
single financial institution. The purpose is to protect the bank from distress 
or insolvency. In this process bank A is considered sound when it meets all 
regulatory requirements and the customers of bank A are protected. Micro-
prudential supervisory tasks are exclusively in the hands of domestic 
supervisors. National supervisors must follow international agreed 
regulations. Supervisors are generally restricted by jurisdictional borders and 
may only operate within their territory. However, supervision may be 
extended extra-territorial in case a bank registered in the home state 
establishes subsidiary offices abroad. The 1992 Minimum Standards for the 
Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their Cross Border 
Establishment states that “All international banking groups and international 
banks should be supervised by a home country authority that capably 
performs consolidated supervision”. Only to the extent that home country 
authorities are “unable or unwilling to initiate the effort to take measures to 
meet these standards, the host country authority should prevent the creation 
in its jurisdiction of any cross-border establishments by that bank or banking 
group.”36 Therefore the burden of proof when not meeting standards lies at 
the host country. The problem is, however, that the host country depends on 
the home country for information on the financial condition of the banking 
group and its subsidiary.  
 
A proposal to substantially improve co-operation between domestic 
supervisors is the establishment of colleges of supervisors. Colleges of 
supervisors are permanent but flexible structures for co-operation and co-
ordination among the national supervisors involved in the supervision of 
significant cross-border banking groups.37 The composition of a college 
                                                
35 G20 Working Group 1 on Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening 
Transparency, February 2009.  
36 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.htm  (accessed at 11 February 2009). 
37 G20 communiqué of 2 April 2009. These colleges provide a framework for the 
consolidating authorities and the other competent authorities to carry out the tasks 
established in the Capital Requirements Directives. In the EU colleges will be established 
under Art. 131 of the Banking Directive 2006/48 EC. Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors, Template for a Multilateral Co-operation and Coordination Agreement on the Supervision 
of XY Group, 27 January 2009. http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/aaafdb97-f131-4af6-96b5-
34720c1bd2ad/CEBS-2007-177-rev-4-_template-for-written-agreemen.aspx (accessed at 22 
March 2009). 
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depends on the banking group that is supervised. Thus a parent banking 
institution in country A with subsidiaries or branches in countries B, C and 
D would bring together the supervisors of the countries involved. For this 
purpose the supervisors would conclude an agreement on co-operation, 
information sharing, sharing and delegation of tasks, on-site examinations, 
responding to crisis situations, et cetera. Accordingly, the organisation of a 
College reflects the legal structure of the banking group. 
 
Colleges of supervisors do not replace domestic supervisors; it merely forces 
them to cooperate. A major problem continues to lie in the poor 
performance of domestic supervisors. Some feeble attempts have been made 
to scrutinise domestic supervisors. The IMF and the World Bank have set up 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) in 1999 through which states 
participate voluntarily. The FSAP monitors the resilience of the financial 
system and to what extent the supervisors comply with standards.38 About 
three-quarters of IMF and World Bank members have been reviewed under 
the programme. The US did not participate in this programme. The 
effectiveness of the FSAP is dubious. In 2003 the IMF did not anticipate any 
problems with the financial market in the UK, even though its financial 
sector was already situated under a volcano that was about to erupt in 2007. 
The IMF also expressed that there was little to worry about the functioning 
of UK’s supervisory regime. The IMF reported that “the UK’s large, 
sophisticated and internationally oriented financial sector features 
fundamentally sound institutions, markets and infrastructure. The banking 
sector appears sufficiently profitable and well-capitalised overall to be able to 
absorb the more likely shocks without major distress, although a number of 
key risks need to be watched”. On supervision the report concludes that “the 
supervisory framework complies or largely complies with most international 
standards and codes, and there is a constant drive amongst the authorities to 
rectify weaknesses (…) supervision in the UK is in its turn supported by a 
well functioning safety net, systemic liquidity, system level surveillance, and 
insolvency arrangements and a high quality accounting and disclosure 
regime”.39   
 
XI. Macro-prudential Oversight 
 
Macro-prudential supervision refers to the supervisory activities towards the 
financial system as a whole. The purpose is to protect the overall economy 
from collapse. This may occur when a series of financial institutions are 
exposed to a similar risk. In the credit crisis exposure to subprime mortgage 
securities loans appeared wide-spread; an early warning system recognising 
the deplorable state of banks’ balance sheets, might have contained the 
                                                
38 http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/ (accessed at 22 March 2009). 
39 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr0346.pdf (accessed at 22 March 
2009). 
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damage. The G20 of finance ministers40 has urged to improve the financial 
system by macro-prudential oversight and international co-operation to 
prevent and resolve crises.  The G20 proposes to achieve this by 
reinforcement of the FSB and the launch of an Early Warning Exercise 
(operated jointly by the IMF and FSB). 
 
In line with this approach the de Larosière Group proposes the 
establishment of a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) that would bring 
together national central banks of EU members and representatives of other 
supervisory bodies (overseeing insurance companies, pension funds and 
securities traders). These bodies must cooperate and provide information to 
the ESRC. The council’s objectives would be to provide oversight over the 
financial markets by making recommendations on macro-prudential policies 
and issue risk warnings when market failures pose a threat. Accordingly, for 
example, the ESRC could act when credit expansion is becoming excessive 
or there is a threat to the global financial system because of abuse of off-
balance sheet transactions or illegitimate regulatory arbitrage.  The proposal 
of the de Larosière Group would not replace central bank supervision by 
establishing a European supervisor. Other proposals make similar 
suggestions or even suggest a supranational supervisor.41 Along the same 
lines, similar systemic risks councils could be set up in financial relevant 
regions such as in Latin America and South East Asia. Major actors such as 
the US42 and China could set up their own risk councils. Systemic Risk 
Councils should meet frequently and report to the WFO. 
 
Concluding Observations 
  
The current system of regulating and supervising international financial 
markets is primarily a matter dealt with by national authorities. To a limited 
extent regulation is harmonised by the Bank for International Settlements 
                                                
40 Communiqué of 14 March, 2009. http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en (visited on 22 
March 2009). 
41 A similar proposal has been to create “A European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), modelled on the European System of Central Banks [that] would comprise a new 
EU-level institution – a European Financial Services Authority. This system would 
supervise those systemically relevant financial institutions that operate on a pan-European 
basis, and it would be the final authority for interpreting and implementing EU financial 
market rules whenever there is a conflict between national regulators”. Cf. Bernhard Speyer 
and Norber Walter (researchers at Deutsche Bank), Europe’s World, Spring 2009. See also 
ECB Board Member Bini Smaghi, urging for unified banking supervision (by the ECB) 
thereby taking over responsibilities from the national central banks. ‘Move to strengthen 
ECB gains support’, Financial Times, 13 February 2009.  
42 A call for a macro-prudential supervision was made by the chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve Bank. ‘Bernanke calls for powerful regulator’, Financial Times, 11 March 2009. Mr 
Bernanke said that a broader approach was also needed. “We must have a strategy that 
regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual 
components,” he said. “In particular, strong and effective regulation and supervision of 
banking institutions, although necessary for reducing systemic risk, are not sufficient by 
themselves to achieve this aim.” 
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(and its Committee on Banking Supervision), the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions, and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors. The impact of international regulators is limited. Adoption of 
internationally agreed regulation is voluntary and national supervisors may 
refrain from complying because they believe that national conditions warrant 
a different approach. Moreover, national supervisors are likely to protect 
national interests; they are tempted to relax enforcement of internationally 
agreed standards if risks can be shifted to other jurisdictions. Domestic 
financial markets and national supervisors have a common interest to conceal 
the exposure of high risks. 
 
Current proposals continue to express political statements without 
substantially improving the institutional framework of supervisors. The G20 
in its communiqué of 2 April 2009 recognises the importance of ensuring 
strong domestic regulatory systems: “we each agree to ensure our domestic 
regulatory systems are strong. But we also agree to establish the much greater 
consistency and systematic co-operation between countries, and the 
framework of internationally agreed high standards, that a global financial 
system requires”. The G20 appears not to aim at an international authority or 
allocate responsibility at the international level. It merely underscores the 
need for international standards and better co-ordination between domestic 
supervisors. 
 
Unless a firm international regulatory and supervisory system is created, the 
international financial system is inherently vulnerable. A system of regulators 
and supervisors under the umbrella of the World Financial Organisation is 
therefore proposed. The system aims to regulate and supervise states and 
financial markets; it recognises the interaction between macro-economic 
policies of states and behaviour or financial markets. The WFO runs the 
system. The system streamlines activities, creates hierarchy and allocates 
responsibilities. It ensures that overlap and lacunae in oversight are avoided.  
 
The political feasibility of creating a system guided by the WFO may be 
doubted for good reasons. States cling to sovereignty and supervision over 
financial markets is a politically sensitive issue. However, post war history has 
proven that important institutions can be created, provided that proposals 
come at the right time. The Bretton Woods institutions, created in 1945, and 
the establishment of GATT in 1947 were truly innovative institutions at a 
time when states agreed that trade protectionism must be banned and the 
international monetary system must not be abused. The establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation in 1995 (including a mandatory dispute settlement 
system) was another major achievement. A system of regulators and 
supervisors builds on existing institutions would properly balance the desire 
to preserve sovereignty and the need to supervise global financial markets. 
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 A Patchwork of Actors in Financial Market Regulation / Supervision 
 
 
  objective composition  
 International Monetary 
Fund 
oversee macro-economic policies of 
member countries and developments in 
the global economy, provide balance of 
payments support to members in need;  
virtually universal membership of countries 
represented by central bank or treasuries  
 
     
 International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 
oversee micro-economic policies of 
developing countries through the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy  Process; project 
financing in development countries; 
encourage foreign direct investment 
virtually universal membership (membership 
open for IMF-members only) 
 
     
 Bank for International 
Settlements 
promote discussion and policy analysis 
among central banks and within the 
international financial community; 
provide a centre for economic and 
monetary research; participate in  
financial transactions  and operations 
central banks or monetary authorities of Algeria, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and  the 
ECB 
 
     
 G-20 promoting open and constructive 
discussion between industrial and 
emerging-market countries on key issues 
related to global economic stability 
informal group of finance ministers and central 
bank governors of 19 countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and the European Union, plus 
representatives of IMF and IBRD 
 
     
 Financial Stability Board 
(successor of Financial 
Stability Forum) 
assess vulnerabilities, promote co-
ordination, monitor and advice on market 
developments, undertake joint strategic 
reviews, set guidelines for supervisory 
colleges, support cross border crisis 
management, collaborate with IMF on 
early warning 
informal group of G-20 national financial 
authorities and standard setting bodies (central 
banks, supervisory authorities and finance 
ministries), plus Australia, Hong Kong, 
Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland and  
international financial institutions (precise 
composition remains unclear, however) 
 
     
 Colleges of supervisors  permanent but flexible structures for co-
operation and co-ordination among the 
national supervisors involved in the 
supervision of significant cross-border 
banking groups 
national supervisors; composition of a college 
depends on the banking group to be supervised. 
 
     
 National Central Banks 
and other domestic 
supervisors 
promote stability through money supply, 
interest rates, short term credit; provide 
micro-prudential oversight by regulating 
and supervising national financial 
markets; however, mandates may differ 
depending on political priorities  
not applicable  
     
 Coordinating international 
bodies: BIS Committee on 
Banking Supervision, The 
International Organization 
of Securities Commissions, 
and the International 
Association of Insurance 
Supervisors. 
develop common standards for 
supervision to be implemented by 
domestic supervisors 
national regulators; various compositions   
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 European Systemic Risk 
Council and other systemic 
risk councils 
exercise macro-prudential supervision 
over the financial system as a whole;  
protect the overall economy from 
collapse by giving early warning signals  
in case of systemic risks 
systemic risks councils do not exist yet; proposed 
by the de Larosière Group, G-20 
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